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Minnesota Law Review Symposium Keynote 
November 18, 2019 
Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle 
of Mass Incarceration 
Rachel E. Barkow† 
Thank you very much for having me. It’s wonderful to be 
here and in particular to be talking about Frank Zimring’s book.1 
I first met Frank shortly after I became a law professor. I don’t 
know if you’ll remember this, Frank, but it’s in my mind quite 
clearly. I was in awe. It was a panel at Columbia Law School, I 
hadn’t been in teaching for very long, and I was going to be on a 
panel with him. I was explaining the thesis of my paper, which 
was an argument that fiscal changes in the states were going to 
bring about bigger sentencing changes, and analyzing why they 
wouldn’t happen at the federal level because they weren’t suffer-
ing from the same kind of cost constraints and the politics were 
different.2 I gave my presentation, and then, when it was Frank’s 
turn, he said that I was practicing social science without a li-
cense. So, Frank, I remain an unlicensed social science driver, 
but I have nevertheless been asked to take the wheel again to 
comment on both your book and, I hope, mine. Thankfully for 
me, you do all the hard social science work in your draft and end 
up backing up observations that I make in my own book, in 
which I use more political economy and some of the politics and 
existing research and data that’s out there on mass incarcera-
tion. But we reach many of the same conclusions, and even come 
to many of the same proposed policies. So if a lawyer like me and 
a social scientist like you end up in the same place, we’re either 
 
†  Vice Dean and Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy 
and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, New York 
University School of Law. Copyright © 2020 by Rachel E. Barkow.  
 1. FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF MASS INCARCERA-
TION (forthcoming 2020). 
 2. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1296–97 (2005). 
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both completely right or hopelessly wrong. But given your track 
record, I think we’re right.  
To set the stage for my remarks I want to start with the cen-
tral point that Frank emphasizes in the draft of the book that I 
suspect will remain the same. And I highly recommend it, be-
cause even in draft version it’s absolutely fantastic. One of the 
things he emphasizes is that, for all the talk around criminal 
justice reform in the United States and the emphasis that there’s 
bipartisan movement to get things done, all the data and trends 
instead point to us continuing to live with mass incarceration 
and excessive criminalization in the United States for the fore-
seeable future.3 Frank explains in the book why there is so much 
momentum for mass incarceration, and reminds us just how 
modest the reforms we’ve seen so far have been.4  
I’m kind of a glass-is-half-empty kind of person, and Frank’s 
book gives me reason to be that way when it comes to criminal 
justice reform. Although more than half the states have lowered 
their incarceration rates, which is good, sixteen states report an 
increase in the number of prisoners in 2016 as compared to 
2007.5 Moreover, if we look at the states that have lowered their 
prison populations, that decrease is actually pretty small when 
you compare it to the prison buildup that took place before that. 
There was an increase of seventy-seven percent between 1972 
and 1981, but the decrease, from 2007 to 2016, was only about 
seven percent.6 So that’s an eleven-to-one differential. So the 
glass is actually eleven-twelfths empty. The overall decrease was 
really driven by outliers like California, which was responsible 
for reducing the number of prisoners—and I’m getting a lot of 
these stats from Frank’s draft—by almost 44,000 people.7 The 
other forty-nine states combined reduced it only by 38,000.8 This 
is just to give you an outline about how this is not a story of large-
scale change happening everywhere.  
What I want to emphasize in my talk today is that it’s not a 
good thing that things are staying where they are, not only be-
cause of the human toll, not only because of the racial disparities 
 
 3. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 4, at 24–27.  
 4. Id. (manuscript ch. 5, at 33) “‘[B]usiness as usual’ in the United States 
of 2020 has incorporated all practices, attitudes and expectations of the fivefold 
expansion in rates of imprisonment.”). 
 5. Id. (manuscript ch. 1, at 14–15).  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 15. 
 8. Id. (manuscript ch. 9, at 11).  
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and the disproportionate impact, but also because this is an ab-
ject failure if the goal is public safety, and if the goal is maxim-
izing our limited resources in the best possible way.  
I teach and write about criminal law and administrative 
law, as Maria [Ponomarenko] pointed out, and I have always 
been struck by the contrast between the two areas. In one space 
where I teach and talk about things, we value expertise, we 
value data, we do cost-benefit analysis, we make our policymak-
ers explain why they’re doing what they’re doing, and they face 
judicial review to make sure they’re not being arbitrary and ca-
pricious, and then in the other space, in criminal law, we just let 
policymakers go with their gut.  
You know the expression when you are in law school that 
bad facts make bad law. Criminal law is basically writ large just 
one example of that. We get policies that are the result of bad 
facts that are on the news, or on social media,9 and they may feel 
emotionally satisfying at the time to segments of our electorate, 
who think that these policies are applying to the absolute worst 
kinds of crimes that they are reading and hearing about. But, in 
fact, these policies often make us less safe in the long term be-
cause of how difficult they make it for people to successfully 
reenter after they’ve served their terms of confinement, because 
of the hurdles we have set up.10  
I think the way out of this is to recognize that we need to 
make criminal justice administration look more like the rest of 
administrative law. And I think Frank agrees. So, this is from a 
draft, but Frank points out that a truly sophisticated adminis-
trative law of crime can lead to a parsimonious and humane pe-
nal system.11 Excessive punishment is evidence of, among other 
things, bad management.12 I hope this stays in, Frank, because 
I agree with it, and I think this key about bad management and 
bad policies is really central for us to take a close look at because 
I think that for far too long the rhetoric—the bill of goods that 
have been sold to us—is that these are the policies we need to 
 
 9. Cf. Chelsea Jubitana, Behind Locked Bars: The Role of Media and Mass 
Incarceration, KENAN INST. ETHICS DUKE U. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://kenan 
.ethics.duke.edu/behind-locked-bars-the-role-of-media-and-mass-incarceration-
march/ [https://perma.cc/SXN6-A8FT] (commenting on the role that the media 
plays in the perception of mass incarceration in America).  
 10. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 9, at 11). 
 11. Id. (manuscript ch. 8, at 24). 
 12. Id.  
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make us safer. That’s the tradeoff. You have to accept this hu-
man misery; you have to somehow accept these racial dispari-
ties. That’s the price for being safer and better off.13 And, in fact, 
I think what we find when we dig deeper, and I am going to ex-
plain some of these today, is that they are actually not good pol-
icies if that’s the goal. They are failing in that effort.  
Frank’s book focuses largely on incarceration, but there is a 
host of surrounding policies as well that share this trait, that 
seem to serve this retributive urge for harsher punishment but 
ultimately represent in my view bad management. And in that I 
mean that they are failing their goal if the goal is to make the 
best use of our limited public resources. I am going to highlight 
just a few resources from my book to give you a sense of what I 
am talking about. The opening chapter explains a dynamic that 
we have in criminal law in the United States which is that we 
lump together people of really different levels of culpability and 
we treat them all as if they are the worst possible offense in that 
category.14 And there are lots of examples of this, but in the in-
terests of time I’ll just give you a couple.  
I’ll start with one that I think people have an intuitive sense 
wouldn’t be like this—the category of sex offender. I think when 
the average person thinks about that term of sex offender they 
are probably thinking of people who commit violent acts of rape, 
people who molest children. But if you look at the actual laws 
that define who qualifies for being a sex offender you find they 
sweep more broadly than that. There was a Human Rights 
Watch [report], for example, that found five of the states require 
you to go on a sex offender registry if you visited a prostitute.15 
Thirteen states will put you on the registry if you urinated in 
public.16 Twenty-nine states require registration for teenagers 
who have consensual sex with another teenager.17  
 
 13. Cf. Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking Public Safety to Reduce Mass Incar-
ceration and Strengthen Communities, MEDIUM (Aug. 20, 2019), https://medium 
.com/@teamwarren/rethinking-public-safety-to-reduce-mass-incarceration-and 
-strengthen-communities-90e8591c6255 [https://perma.cc/E6JW-ULG3] (“It’s a 
false choice to suggest a tradeoff between safety and mass incarceration.”). 
 14. RACHEL E. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF 
MASS INCARCERATION (2019).  
 15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN 
THE US 39 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907 
webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJK8-FBJ4].  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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I could give you examples of the kind of cases that are par-
ticularly demonstrative of how irrational these policies are. A 
nine-year-old plays doctor with a six-year-old and ends up on the 
registry.18 One elementary school child plays a prank on a class-
mate and pulls down the kids pants; on the registry.19 There are 
not as many of those, but they are there. But, more critically, 
what it is dominated by are teenagers who get on registries after 
they sext with each other, after they send sexually-explicit pho-
tos of themselves to each other.  
What is critical about this is that the sentencing and collat-
eral consequences for people who are labeled as sex offenders are 
not based in thinking about the totality of this category. They 
are not thinking about the range of different people who are in 
it. They are not thinking about children playing pranks or people 
who go to people engaged in sex work or who are teenagers send-
ing pictures to each other. They are set with the worst kinds of 
crimes in this category in mind. What ends up happening is you 
look around the country and what you find are very harsh man-
datory minimum sentences. There are sex offender registration 
requirements that are often quite severe—often putting people 
on registries for life not to mention all kinds of bans on where 
people can live and where they are allowed to go.  
It’s not just true of this category of sex offender, it’s true of 
a host of other categories and labels as well. You could look in 
our laws and find this just about everywhere. One example is we 
give collateral consequences to people who have felony convic-
tions because they are all in the category of “felons.” That is a 
really wide category of behaviors, and yet there are very harsh 
treatments that apply to everybody who is in that category. We 
sentence all drug traffickers, in many places, who deal in certain 
quantities of a certain type of drug the same. Wherever they fall 
on the drug trafficking hierarchy in their organization. It doesn’t 
matter if they are a key manager versus someone who is just 
selling to support a habit. Their sentence and their treatment is 
largely driven by the quantity of the drugs and the type. Three 
strikes laws, recidivist sentencing laws for people who have 
 
 18. See Abigail Pesta, The Accidental Sex Offender, MARIE CLAIRE (July 28, 
2011), http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a6294/teen-sex-offender 
[https://perma.cc/LTY4-XK48]. 
 19. See Sarah Stillman, The List: When Juveniles Are Found Guilty of Sex-
ual Misconduct, the Sex-Offender Registry Can Be a Life Sentence, NEW YORKER 
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/when-kids 
-are-accused-of-sex-crimes [https://perma.cc/7KBU-NKXL]. 
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repeat offenses, also tend to be these really broad categories of 
people all lumped in together.  
The key part of this dynamic is, when they are lumped in 
like that, it’s not that the sentencing range or the treatment of 
them reflects the wide variety; it’s very often the case that they 
are all being treated as the worst among them. Now, this is dis-
proportionate as a matter of retributive justice and thinking of 
the punishment that people deserve for what they’ve done. But 
what I want to emphasize is how pernicious it is for public safety, 
and I think the tendency might be that people think, well, you 
know, that maybe it’s disproportionate as a matter of justice but 
if we give people longer sentences or we treat them more harshly, 
so what? Don’t we get more deterrence that way? Isn’t it better 
for public safety to do that? And what I want to point out is that 
the research tells us otherwise.  
For starters, we’ve known for a while that it matters far 
more—for someone trying to decide if they are going to commit a 
crime—whether or not they are going to get caught as opposed 
to the sentence length that they face if they do. And, the assump-
tion that more severe sentences are better also just focuses on 
the period that someone is incarcerated. We think that while 
someone is incarcerated they are incapacitated and they can’t 
commit offenses outside of the facility they are held. We think 
that’s a benefit. And it is.  
But it’s important to weigh that benefit against what hap-
pens when people get out. And, it’s important here to note that 
ninety-five percent of the people who are incarcerated rejoin all 
of us.20 They are part of our communities. We would want to 
know if their time incarcerated has an effect on them when they 
come out. And I think there has been a conventional assumption 
that, “Oh, it must be really great for that, because they are going 
to be deterred from doing things again,” with not enough empha-
sis on, “what if their time while they were incarcerated actually 
was harmful from a public safety perspective?” What if, in fact, 
being in prison itself is criminogenic: if the environment is such 
that it makes it harder for people to reenter.21  
 
 20. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCER-
ATION AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 39 (2016) (citing Michael Mueller-Smith, The 
Criminal Labor Market Impacts of Incarceration (2015) (working paper) (on file 
with author)). 
 21. See, e.g., Scott D. Camp & Gerald G. Gaes, FED. BUREAU PRISONS & 
NAT’L INST. JUST. Criminogenic Effects of Prison Environment on Inmate 
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Being separated from their social networks and the people 
that they love is actually harmful from a public safety goal. 
There is an interesting study out of Texas that finds that after a 
certain point in somebody’s sentence each additional year that 
they serve causes a four to seven percent increase in their recid-
ivism rate. That’s a really important fact, because it suggests 
that there are these tipping points in long sentences where what-
ever benefit we were going to get from incapacitation is going to 
get outweighed by the harms to reentry when people come back 
out, from what those longer sentences are doing to them. And, if 
you stop to think about it, it makes sense because longer sen-
tences for starters means that there are more people in prison 
and so there are fewer resources to go around for everyone.22 So, 
there’s not enough programming for everyone. 
It also ignores the fact that most people are going to age out 
of their criminal behavior.23 I’ll leave that to our expert criminol-
ogists to give you further detail on, but we’ve known this for a 
really long time.  
We are putting people in prison and keeping them there long 
past the point when they would have aged out of whatever crim-
inal behavior they are engaged in. At a certain point, we have 
incarceration reaching this sort of tipping point, and it is not go-
ing to be associated with a reduction in crime but an increase. 
Now, I can’t tell you where that tipping point is, but I will tell 
you that, during my time on the [United States] Sentencing 
Commission, that’s what I asked every single criminologist and 
data person that came before us, and no one is actually able to 
pinpoint it. But a rational conversation about criminal justice 
would recognize that it’s there and seek to balance these 
tradeoffs between long sentences—that they’re just not a com-
plete good for public safety—just the opposite, that in fact they 
start to have just the opposite effect and make people less safe.  
I will point to a couple of real-world examples of this, that 
we do know about, where we have seen jurisdictions reduce their 
sentences and that have not seen an increase in crime, which is 
 
Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence (2004), https://www.bop.gov/resources/ 
research_projects/published_reports/cond_envir/camp_gaes_c&d.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BB5J-LHUB]. 
 22. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch.4, at 7). 
 23. See, e.g., Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?: Why People Age 
Out of Crime, and What it Could Mean for How Long We Put Them Away, MAR-
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one empirical way that you can demonstrate this. One example 
from my time on the Sentencing Commission is that we lowered 
all drug sentences—all federal drug sentences in the United 
States—by two levels in the guideline manual, which in practical 
terms ends up being about twenty-five months on average for a 
person.24 That’s a two-year reduction in sentence and we made 
this retroactive. And that meant that more than 30,000 people 
in federal prison were able to go before a judge and get their sen-
tences reduced and were released early.  
What is interesting about this decision is that we made it as 
part of a bi-partisan sentencing commission with four Democrats 
and three Republicans and we were unanimous. In this time in 
America you might ask how could that be, how could you get a 
unanimous decision out of four Democrats and three Republi-
cans? And the reason is that we had data from when the Sen-
tencing Commission had done this in the past. The Sentencing 
Commission had reduced crack sentences in 2007—had lowered 
them by two levels—and we were able to track what happened 
to the people who got the reductions over a period of five years. 
We could see whether it mattered that someone got their sen-
tence reduced as compared to the people that served their full 
sentence, because the reductions came too late for them to get 
the benefit.  
It was really nice because you could match people who were 
similarly situated for offense and criminal history and the only 
difference between them was that one group got this reduction 
and one group didn’t. Five years later there was no statistically 
significant difference in their recidivism rates. In fact, the group 
that got the sentencing reductions had a lower rate. Looking at 
that enabled the Sentencing Commission to say unanimously 
that we can do this for all drugs and we can feel confident that 
we can lower sentences without a cost to public safety.  
States around the country have done similar things. We 
have seen them reduce their sentences and their incarceration 
rates without upticks in crime. And I am confident we can do far 
more and not see an increase.  
I want to spend a minute talking about how this relates to 
pre-trial detention as well. There are about half a million 
 
 24. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commis-
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people—a little shy of half a million people—who find them-
selves incarcerated before they have been convicted of any of-
fense.25 And, here too, we should ask: how does that work for 
public safety, would that be a good thing or a bad thing? And 
here, again, it’s just like the story with incarceration and people 
sentenced after their conviction. If we stop for a minute and 
think about what it means to be detained pre-trial, it means that 
you are likely going to lose your job because your employer is not 
really going to wait around because you have been put in jail. 
You often lose your housing—you get evicted. You may lose your 
children—custody of your children—because there’s no one to 
take care of them while you are incarcerated. This is a com-
pletely life-altering event for people, even when it’s a short pe-
riod of time. 
When people have studied what does it mean to detain peo-
ple pre-trial versus not, they have found that it increases recidi-
vism risk.26 It’s a parallel story to the one that we see for people 
who are sentenced after conviction, where they are more likely 
to recidivate when they are released than the people who weren’t 
detained and they control for criminal history and offence type. 
The idea is that there is something about the pre-trial detention 
itself, and they have found that that increase is true both for the 
risk of more felonies and the risk of more misdemeanors—so this 
is a risk of felony reoffending as well.  
Here too, it’s just to point out there are costs to these policies 
that I think are not part of our public discussion, because the 
public discussion is always just around the person who is re-
leased pre-trial who commits a violent offense and someone asks 
why they weren’t detained. Whose fault was that? Was that the 
prosecutor? Was that the judge who screwed up, because surely 
the person should have been detained? Then there’s often a push 
in jurisdictions to change their entire set-up of pre-trial deten-
tion and their whole bail regime to avoid that one case that 
makes it into the media. And what you don’t get is a discussion 
of the flip side. There’s not the news story that says, wow, our 
pre-trial detention policies dramatically increase the risk of 
 
 25. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 
2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/H55G-GVAT]. 
 26. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD 
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future crime because we are detaining too many people. Because 
that’s not a news story. There are no statistical news stories. I 
would watch that network but not many people would. And so, 
as a result of that, we get a really jaded perspective on the costs 
and benefits of detention, both after conviction and at pre-trial.  
Another flaw in our approach is thinking about what hap-
pens to people while they are detained. When we think about 
what makes them worse off, sometimes it’s just being separated 
from social networks and people whom they love. But it’s also 
that we don’t make investments in programming.27 This is a big 
theme in Frank’s draft, and I believe will stay in the final book 
too (this is the awkward part about talking about a book that is 
not in its final form, but I feel confident it will stay in there as 
well). It’s this idea that it’s really important to ask what happens 
to people while they’re incarcerated, particularly if we’re not go-
ing to be reducing these populations any time soon.  
It should be a real focus of our reform efforts to ask what we 
are doing while they are incarcerated. About eighty-five percent 
of the people who are incarcerated have a substance abuse prob-
lem. And yet, only about eleven percent of people get any treat-
ment28 We see the same thing if we ask about other categories 
like people with mental health needs and whether they are get-
ting mental health treatment, or whether people are receiving 
cognitive behavioral treatment, vocational training, or educa-
tional programming.29 These interventions are cost-benefit jus-
tified. They work.30 They are good investments. If they were on 
my administrative law side of the ledger, they would all be up-
held as good public policy interventions. But we are not doing 
that and instead less than ten percent of people who are incar-
cerated are getting this kind of programming, even though these 
would be good investments, and we would be saving far more 
 
 27. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 1).  
 28. The NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA 
UNIV., BEHIND BARS II: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 
i–ii (2010), https://www.centeronaddiction.org/addiction-research/reports/ 
behind-bars-ii-substance-abuse-and-america%E2%80%99s-prison-population 
[https://perma.cc/4WWM-UGVM]. 
 29. See BARKOW, supra note 14, at 61–67.  
 30. See, e.g., Carolyn Zezima, Incarcerated with Mental Illness: How to Re-
duce the Number of People with Mental Health Issues in Prison, PSYCOM (Mar. 
5, 2019), https://www.psycom.net/how-to-reduce-mental-illness-in-prisons 
[https://perma.cc/HF6Q-KDZ3] (describing the successful Criminal Mental 
Health Project implemented in Florida). 
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money by making the investment because of what it would mean 
for reduced recidivism later and lowering incarceration. 
We also don’t do other things when it comes to confinement 
that, as a public policy matter, would make sense. These aren’t 
so much about programming, but are just about the way that 
prisons operate. For example, we often put people far away from 
their families and their support networks, but that’s a terrible 
idea if our goal is public safety.31 We want them to be near their 
communities, their families, the places where when they come 
out, they are going to get jobs.  
Putting them far away is a terrible public policy idea if that’s 
our goal.  
Similarly, we want them in a place where people can easily 
visit, but we are making it hard for families, particularly fami-
lies who are poor—they are disproportionately poor—and these 
visits are tremendously difficult for people.32 We make phone 
calls expensive even though that policy is terrible as a public pol-
icy matter.33 We would want calls frankly to be free, because 
keeping people connected is really valuable.  
We might ask, well, if these are all such great ideas, why 
aren’t we doing them? One reason is that prisons are not held 
accountable for any of the outcomes that happen after people 
leave their custody.34 We are not evaluating them and asking 
how did things work for the incarcerated person while they were 
with you? And then what happens to people later? When prisons 
are doing their own cost-benefit analysis, that is not a key part 
of what they are focused on.  
When they are thinking about prison phone calls, they are 
thinking of, one, they can actually make a fair amount of money 
from their cut of charging people for calls and, two, they don’t 
like some of the calls—you know not all of the calls are good calls. 
 
 31. See William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the 
Transition to Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 287, 304–05 (2008). 
 32. See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Separation by Bars and Miles: 
Visitation in State Prisons, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 20, 2015), https:// 
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/prisonvisits.html [https://perma.cc/9RZN-KN5F]. 
 33. See Wendy Sawyer, Why Expensive Phone Calls Can Be Life-Altering 
for People in Jail – and Can Derail the Justice Process, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/02/05/jail-phone-calls/ 
[https://perma.cc/X2FX-GBED]. 
 34. See Daniel Mears, Accountability, Efficiency, and Effectiveness in Cor-
rections: Shining a Light on the Black Box of Prison Systems, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 143 (2008). 
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Some of the calls could be calls to engage in criminal activity, so 
they have to monitor those. They have to have a mechanism in 
place to monitor them.  
But prisons only focus on those things when they are mak-
ing their policies, and they are not thinking about this tradeoff 
which is good for the rest of us—that is good for the public—be-
cause, on net, charging people for calls does nothing to help with 
the monitoring—it just means that there are fewer calls, but it 
doesn’t mean that people that can somehow afford to pay for 
them are less dangerous than people who can’t.  
It’s also the case that, when prisons and prison officials are 
making decisions about other things within their four walls, they 
are really focused on the here and now for them. And it’s not that 
they are engaging in bad faith—and I’m not suggesting that—I 
think this is just basic human behavior. If someone is misbehav-
ing in front of them, and they think that solitary confinement is 
a basic disciplinary tool that they want to use because it helps 
them maintain order at the moment, they are going to think 
about that. They are not going to be thinking about the fact that 
putting someone in solitary confinement—in addition to being 
indescribably cruel, does damage that lasts when they come back 
out and so it’s very hard from a readjustment perspective. But 
again, the official may not be balancing that out.  
When we think about a setup like that, that doesn’t hold 
prisons and their administration accountable for how their poli-
cies affect people when they come back out and rejoin society, we 
shouldn’t really be surprised that they’re not focused on it and 
that we have really abysmal recidivism rates for people when 
they come out of prison. More than seventy percent of those who 
are released have new arrests or convictions within five years 
after they come out.35 I don’t think we should expect much dif-
ferent outcomes if we’re not evaluating prisons to try to get those 
rates lower and to try to have that be a more positive interven-
tion.  
Now the reason that doesn’t happen is I think there is a ten-
dency in our society to just blame the person. That is, there is a 
tendency to assume it is not the prison’s fault, that it is the fault 
of the individual who comes out and decides to commit a new 
crime or who comes out and decides to keep taking drugs. And, 
if we see this as just a problem of personal responsibility, we 
 
 35. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 
2005–2010 (2014).  
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never ask how prisons are doing, because we just think they are 
places that individuals will go and come back out and it’s all on 
the individual. But that is a pretty strange way to view a mas-
sive government program of intervention. If you think about gov-
ernment programs, you would be hard pressed to find many big-
ger than our use of prisons and jails. This is a massive 
government intervention on an enormous scale, and we should 
be asking for government accountability. Are you doing a good 
job when you’re doing this? Are you making things better? Are 
you making things worse?  
I think you know we have gone away from that, because, in 
part, of this turn away from seeing the notion of rehabilitation 
as possibly being something that could happen. I think that is 
definitely something that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
idea that, well, things aren’t working very well. The interven-
tions aren’t working very well, and then that led to policy 
changes that reflected the sentiment that really nothing works 
to rehabilitate. What you end up with is a focus on facilities that 
are really just warehousing people.  
It has other effects as well. It leads to this idea not to ask 
what are the interventions in prison, but it also means that we 
lose a lot of the second looks at people themselves over time. Be-
cause if you don’t think that people can change—if you don’t 
think that’s possible—then you don’t need to look at them as 
time passes and ask if they have. That also explains why we have 
seen a decline in parole, why we have seen a decline in clemency 
and other second-look mechanisms.  
I’ll give you one example of that, which proves this point 
pretty well. There was a lot of talk about President Obama’s 
clemency grants, which I was quite grateful for—that he granted 
as many people clemency as he did. But, if you look at what he 
did in historical perspective, what you notice is his overall grant 
rate didn’t even exceed Ronald Reagan. And, President Nixon 
had more commutations than President Obama did.36 So, alt-
hough he talked about having numbers—clemency commutation 
numbers—that were higher than other presidents, actually his 
rate was fairly low. And you see that when you see how many 
 
 36. Rachel Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Defer-
ence to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 387, 437 (2017).  
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people he denied, which is more denials than any modern presi-
dent by a mile.37  
Now is that because you needed to deny more people because 
the overall population of those incarcerated was somehow worse? 
I would argue just the opposite. We had expanded it so much to 
cover people who had committed drug offenses and who were 
there serving mandatory minimums where the judge really was 
not able to give the sentence that they wanted. If anything, the 
rate should have gone up. But I think part of this is just this 
political environment—that it’s risky for any executive to give 
clemency because they too don’t want that bad news story—the 
one case going awry. It is a common theme in criminal justice.  
Now, in administrative law, we don’t do that. We are not 
supposed to do that. We are supposed to rationally say, okay, the 
vaccine has this rare outcome in some cases but overall there are 
enormous public health benefits. The same with air travel: there 
may be an accident, but overall it is enormously beneficial for 
society, and so we try to figure out how to minimize risk while 
keeping the overall approach, which we know to be beneficial.  
But, in criminal law, we don’t do that kind of balancing. We 
let the outlier case drive what we do. Weirdly, it means that 
criminal law ends up being oddly frozen in time as well, because 
we make these decisions about people and sometimes we give 
them decades-long sentences—thirty years, twenty years—and 
don’t reevaluate them even though it would defy everything we 
know about human nature to think that those people and their 
attitudes may not have changed. Or, for example, to assume that 
we as a society may not have changed how we view particular 
crimes. If you even just think about the changes in the perspec-
tive on marijuana over the years, I think it becomes obvious that 
you want to take second looks at things and reevaluate. But we 
have created an environment in many jurisdictions in the United 
States where that just isn’t in the cards for folks. There is not 
going to be a second look. Even though we might have an initial 
panic over a kind of crime, we put the policy in place, and we 
don’t get to revisit it. The politics of this make it very hard to do 
that.  
 
 37. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
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We’ve seen parole either disappear or decline dramatically 
in jurisdictions because of single cases of a parolee committing 
an offense.38 We’ve seen the decline in clemency, in good time 
credits that people can earn while they’re incarcerated, compas-
sionate release, and retroactive adjustments.39 Just to give you 
historical perspective, it wasn’t always like this in America. We 
had seventy percent release rates for people on parole in the 
United States as recently as the 1970s.40 Clemency was a routine 
thing that governors and the president had given before parole 
came on the stage to essentially replace it. So, between the two 
of them, we were actually giving lots of second looks in our sys-
tem.  
One more example that I want to give you is collateral con-
sequences because I think you will see the same dynamic there 
as well. There are upwards of 47,000 collateral consequences for 
people who have committed crimes, and they range from making 
it more difficult for people to get housing and licenses to re-
strictions on voting.41 There are about nineteen million people 
who have been convicted of felonies in America so these are af-
fecting an awful lot of people.42 And I just want to focus on the 
fact of how so many of these things make it very difficult for peo-
ple to successfully rejoin after serving terms of incarceration and 
stay on a path of law-abiding behavior.  
Take housing. Housing is a crucial need for people who are 
released from prison. A third of the people who are released from 
prison are homeless within six months and yet Congress has 
passed very strict bans on access to public housing. Some of the 
harshest target people who are engaged in drug trafficking.43 So, 
if someone in your household is selling or using drugs, even if 
they are not doing it in the public housing itself, they are just 
 
 38. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., MAX OUT: THE RISE IN PRISON INMATES RE-
LEASED WITHOUT SUPERVISION 2 (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/ 
assets/2014/06/04/maxout_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6RA-RDVA]. 
 39. BARKOW, supra note 14, at 78–87.  
 40. DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE 
21ST CENTURY: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 19 (2001), https://www 
.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesI/nij/189106-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7HB-PDPV].  
 41. Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 307–09 (2015).  
 42. Id. at 328. 
 43. Bruce Western et al., Stress and Hardship After Prison, 120 AM. J. SOC. 
1512, 1526 (2015).  
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doing it some place, your whole household can be evicted.44 
Think about how hard it is to stay on a law-abiding path when 
you don’t have a home, how much more difficult is it to go get a 
job. It makes everything harder.  
Similarly, Congress, when it ended welfare as we know it in 
1996, said to states that they had to impose lifetime bans on peo-
ple with drug-related felony convictions from either getting fed-
eral welfare aid or food stamps.45 Now, states can opt out of this. 
They can opt out of the lifetime ban and some have done so, but 
people with a felony drug conviction in America are still fully or 
partially excluded from food stamp benefits in thirty states and 
in thirty-six states from welfare assistance.46 Again, this is tran-
sitional aid that really helps people make the transition into em-
ployment, but it’s setting up a hurdle in their way.  
Congress also created additional incentives for states to cre-
ate more collateral consequences. It passed a law that said states 
would lose ten percent of their federal highway dollars unless 
the state passed laws to revoke or suspend driver’s licenses of 
people who had been convicted of drug felonies.47 Here too, some 
of the states have decided the money is not worth it. But there 
are still eighteen jurisdictions, which account for forty-eight per-
cent of our country’s residents, with a ban on a driver’s license if 
you have this drug felony conviction.48  
In a majority of these jurisdictions, there are no more than 
two percent of workers who are able to rely on public trans- 
 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2018) (allowing public housing landlords to ter-
minate housing for “any household with a member” who is determined to be 
using a controlled substance). 
 45. Id. § 862(a).  
 46. Rebecca Beitsch, States Rethink Restrictions on Food Stamps, Welfare 




 47. 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2018).  
 48. Joshua Aiken, Reinstating Common Sense: How Driver’s License Sus-
pensions for Drug Offenders Unrelated to Driving Are Falling Out of Favor, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/driving/national 
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portation to get to work.49 Think about what the situation is for 
these folks: they have to decide whether they are they going to 
drive on a suspended license—there’s no public transportation 
option—to get to work. What are they going to do?  
We are making it really, really difficult for people to reenter 
society and make transitions to law-abiding behaviors. And, 
again, we are lumping all kinds of people together for these col-
lateral consequences. There are many, many examples of these. 
I just wanted to give you a flavor of some of them.  
The next key question is why do we end up with this result? 
I have already alluded to some of the political dynamics that cre-
ate this. This system is really not the outcome of rational reflec-
tion, but dysfunctional politics. And, as Frank notes in his draft, 
the cumulative effect of this is that we end up with mass incar-
ceration.50 When we look at how this all happens, I think that 
one of the really important themes in his book is this idea that 
it’s not that there was one central planner that did this. Instead, 
we have lots of pockets of discretion in American criminal poli-
cymaking.51 Prosecutors have discretion, judges often have dis-
cretion, governors, presidents to exercise clemency, parole offi-
cials—lots of actors with discretion. What’s interesting is how 
basically the political climate creates a situation where those ac-
tors choose to exercise their discretion in a way that leads to 
enormous punitive consequences for people and, particularly, to 
prison.52 Because Frank’s book notes that it’s not that we see a 
general trend of creating new crimes or new maximum or mini-
mum punishments. Instead, it’s this dynamic of how people are 
letting politics affect their exercise of discretion.53 
So, what does that? What creates that kind of political envi-
ronment that leads people to do this? We do have a political pro-
cess that is focused on particular stories that get a lot of atten-
tion in the media. And if you study what the media covers you 
find there’s a pretty steady drumbeat of offenses involving the 
most violent cases that make people really angry. Or they’ll talk 
 
 49. See ADIE TOMER ET AL., METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAM AT BROOK-
INGS, MISSED OPPORTUNITY: TRANSIT AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 
(2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0512_jobs_ 
transit.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY4J-S4X7]. 
 50. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 1). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. (manuscript ch. 3). 
 53. Id. (manuscript ch. 8). 
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about sentencing—it’s a focus on sentences that are too lenient—
so that people get upset about that. Politicians know that’s 
what’s being portrayed. They also know that they can drum up 
support for themselves and get attention if they point out that 
there’s things that people are afraid of or that make people an-
gry.54  
And, in addition to the fact that elected officials do this, we 
now have a group of people that have a stake in keeping punish-
ment the way that it is.55 A financial stake for some because they 
are bail bondsmen and they don’t want to lose the ability to con-
tinue to have their industry operate if there is pre-trial detention 
reform or if they make money off of prison phone calls. Or, if they 
have a professional interest that’s maybe not strictly speaking 
financial, but it makes their job easier to have certain policies in 
place, which is certainly true, for example, for prosecutors whose 
jobs are tremendously easier if they have mandatory minimums 
to threaten people with and longer sentences if someone were to 
decide to exercise their trial right. So, you have all those folks 
with a stake in maintaining punitive practices because of how 
helpful they are in doing their jobs.  
That creates a dynamic that makes it very hard to dismantle 
because it gives everyone the incentive to keep things how they 
are. And it all starts from a public mood that sentences are too 
lenient, because they are thinking about the cases that they’re 
seeing. There is information in Frank’s book that talks a lot 
about this, that there are people who have this view that sen-
tences are too lenient.56 There are studies that show this view is 
not tied to people who live in areas that have high rates of 
crime.57 So, the sentiment is not related to higher crime rates to 
explain some of the things we are seeing. Instead, they just have 
a general sensibility, which I do think comes in part from how 
things get covered in the media. This mood that things are too 
lenient and how people view sentencing doesn’t vary even while 
crime rates do.58  
 
 54. Id. (manuscript ch. 3).  
 55. See id. (manuscript ch. 4).  
 56. Id. (manuscript ch. 8, at 15). 
 57. E.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND PUBLIC 
OPINION: A SUMMARY OF RECENT STUDIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SEN-
TENCING POLICY (2001), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/sl_crimepunish_ 
publicopinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LBU-EYMR].  
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It’s not the case that the public mood is tracking crime rates 
nor is it the case that our incarceration boom is tracking crime 
rates. The incarceration boom may track this popular perception 
that things are too lenient and all these groups that want to have 
harsher sentences, but that is also not tracking crime rates. So, 
it is not the case that this is tied together in that way. Instead, 
there’s a political dynamic that’s working here about how people 
are thinking about crime, even if it’s not borne out by actual sta-
tistics.  
Frank’s book reminds us that it’s not just the public that 
thinks sentences are too lenient. He points out that the group of 
people who go into prosecution and law enforcement really have 
strong views on where sentences are, and that matters for a few 
reasons.59 One is that it’s really important to know that your dis-
trict attorneys—people who are prosecutors—are really critical 
lobbyists for punishment policies in America. Their thumbprints 
are everywhere when you look at almost any law that affects 
criminal punishment. They, either directly as a district attorney 
or part of a lobbying association of district attorneys, are almost 
always in opposition to any kind of sentencing reform.  
We are seeing it play out right now in New York where we 
passed bail reform, which is going to kick in in January [2020].60 
And they are sounding the alarms all over the place about how 
bad this is going to be. They have no data, but they are talking 
about individual cases. They are using anecdotes. They are using 
the same playbill that I’m sure you all know well. I’ll give you an 
example, not from New York, but it’s one of my favorites. This if 
from a district attorney in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, 
who, as it turns out, had his own misbehavior, but before that 
happened and he got into trouble of his own, he was pushing for 
longer sentences for people who were selling heroin. He wanted 
to have much higher sentences in state prison, especially for re-
peat offenders, and he advocated for this. And now I’m going to 
quote him; I like this quote because it is so honest. He said, “I’m 
pissed off. And we need to do something about it.”61  
 
 59. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8). 
 60. See Elizabeth Janowski, New York Bail Changes Set to Take Effect in 
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https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/new-york-bail-changes-set 
-take-effect-january-despite-late-n1099326 [https://perma.cc/YJ5A-MJHA].  
 61. Caitlin Sinett, ‘I’m Pissed Off,’ Lancaster County D.A. Taking a Stand 




2644 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2625 
 
I actually think that’s one of the more honest sentiments 
about how we ended up with where we are. If someone’s pissed 
off, they think something’s too lenient, they are mad about a 
crime they have just heard about, and they think we need to do 
something about it. And the something is a longer sentence; it’s 
an expansion of some collateral consequence, and it makes it 
seem like they are doing something about the problem, and no 
one is bothering to ask: Does that something work? Is that the 
best thing we could do? And, in many cases, it’s not, and it ends 
up being ineffectual, but it creates a political environment where 
it’s very hard to be on the other side of this.  
What you end up seeing from this political environment is 
that our institutional backgrounds and structures in the United 
States have changed over the decades, because. Although a lot of 
this was sparked by an initial rise in violent crime and a legiti-
mate concern of people that we ought to do things differently, 
you know what I think is valuable—among many of the valuable 
things in Frank’s book—is kind of how that then takes on a life 
of its own. You initially respond to an incidence of higher violent 
crime rates in the 1970s, for example, and 1980s, but you create 
all kinds of institutional changes as a result that long outlast 
why you created them in the first place.62 And then they are very 
hard to undo.  
One of the things that ended up happening is that we had 
doctrinal changes that led to a decline in jury trials; that the Su-
preme Court says it’s okay for prosecutors to threaten people 
with really long sentences if they go to trial and exercise their 
jury trial right.63 People weren’t sure the Supreme Court was 
going to say that was okay. It had been done, but it had been 
done on the down-low. Once the Supreme Court comes out and 
says that’s okay, that diminishes the power of the jury. As does 
having more mandatory minimum sentences which makes it 
easier for prosecutors to say either plead guilty now or I’m going 
to charge you with this crime that has a mandatory minimum 
attached and then you will, if you are convicted, get ten years, 
twenty years, thirty years, life. Similarly, the increase of pre-




 62. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 3). 
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they just want to get out, so they will plead and take time 
served.64  
You really see a decline in the jury as a result of these fac-
tors changing. We talked about the decline in clemency and pa-
role—these second looks that take place. And we also really see 
far less court oversight. In part that is because of mandatory 
sentences that make it difficult for judges, in part because of 
some changes to the bench itself that I want to talk about. What 
you see are institutional changes that are really critical to pay 
attention to, because if you are going to dismantle this you need 
to think about these institutional dynamics and how you’re going 
to undo them.  
And, in addition to that, I think you also need to think about 
money. Some of the themes in Frank’s book talk about this, this 
kind of insidious momentum as he describes it, of mass incarcer-
ation. So, we invested money in things: we hired more district 
attorneys, ADAs, more assistant prosecutors, and more law en-
forcement agents. Now, they are in place, and they have to do 
something, because they are there. When you build more pris-
ons, you fill them, and it’s very hard to close them, and it’s very 
hard to lower the number of people who work in these jobs.65 
Those are really important changes that create a vested stake in 
keeping things as they are because people’s livelihoods depend 
upon it.  
In addition to that, to thinking about how law enforcement 
budgets have ballooned, Frank’s book reminds us that it has cre-
ated an environment and a culture where the measure of success 
for folks can be these long sentences. For prosecutors that’s a 
badge showing that they have been good at their job. So we need 
to think culturally how that gets dismantled, because if that’s 
the measure by which people are judging themselves then we 
would have to figure out what other measures could be used in-
stead that may be better.  
Again, think about the costs of how expensive incarceration 
is. Your local district attorney, when they put somebody in state 
prison, that doesn’t cost them very much money because they 
don’t have to pay for it. And so it’s a free resource that as Frank 
 
 64. Cf. Hamilton Nolan, Study: Pretrial Detention Makes Poor People Plead 
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and his co-author had talked about before, amounts to a correc-
tional free lunch.66 It creates financial disincentives for reform.  
In the time that I have left, I am going to quickly go through 
three pillars of reform that try to dismantle this institutional dy-
namic that I think are critical.  
I want to start with prosecutors. They are actors who use 
their discretion to increase incarceration and so one corrective is 
to think about how to rein that in. There’s a host of things that 
we could be doing on that score. One is thinking about the way 
in which they use pre-trial detention as a leverage point for 
themselves, and cash bail is often a big part of that. We can elim-
inate cash bail without any effects on public safety—it’s just pe-
nalizing people who are poor. We could dramatically lower pre-
trial detention, and that has an enormous effect on prosecutors’ 
ability to leverage pleas. We could also eliminate mandatory 
minimums. So these are some policy things that are not only 
good policies in their own right, but they really do affect the lev-
erage that prosecutors have. Open file discovery and second 
looks are also on that list.  
But I think it’s also important to focus on how you go about 
doing that—how you get that—and we are seeing a movement 
around the country to elect more progressive prosecutors.67  
And here, I will just say that and I’m happy to talk more 
about this in response to questions because my time is running 
out. When we are thinking about what it actually means for 
someone to be progressive, if your goal is actually to have a pros-
ecutor who is focused on data and evidence and what actually 
works to reduce crimes, then they should be out there on the 
front lines advocating and lobbying for these changes even when 
it’s against what might be the professional interest in making 
their job easier. They should be guardians of public safety more 
broadly and advocating for exactly these reforms that I am talk-
ing about.  
There are other things that they could be doing as well, and 
I am happy to talk about that more when we get to questions if 
you have them, but one of them is also making them internalize 
the costs of incarceration, creating financial incentives so when 
 
 66. Id. at 26 (“Adversarial pressures step on the prosecutorial gas pedal. 
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they are deciding to send people to prison it’s just not completely 
free for them. So, either financial incentives to give them re-
wards when they don’t or penalize them when they do.  
The second key reform and area of institutional change re-
ally does get at this idea of using the agency model. Because re-
ally prosecutors can’t go it alone here, even the most progressive 
ones. They are not responsible for this whole category of criminal 
justice policies, and we do need people who take a coordinated 
approach to things. This is not a problem unique to criminal jus-
tice. This is a problem that is true across regulatory spaces and 
areas when we regulate health and safety. What we want is to 
make sure that we have people who are looking at the best evi-
dence we have and doing the best they can with the information 
available to us. If we think about using an agency model, we can 
use that as a potential path forward. They could study incarcer-
ation policies, things like visitation policies, things like where 
people are confined, collateral consequences, second look mech-
anisms, and give us the best that we know on our existing 
knowledge.  
Frank talks about using the agency model in his book as 
well. He talks about sentencing commissions as places that have 
done some good particularly when they have been limited by ca-
pacity constraints because those capacity constraints are very 
helpful in using limited resources. If you have to build additional 
prisons as a result of a policy change, then maybe we shouldn’t 
do it given the cost.68 Maybe we should find a way to think about, 
are there different policies we could pursue that don’t cost as 
much. For example, Frank highlights, and many of us as well, 
the Minnesota Sentencing Commission, an administrative 
agency that has done a pretty good job in terms of using its abil-
ity to rationalize resources as a potential model.69 I agree with 
that. I think the experience with sentencing commissions in the 
states backs this up.  
Not all of them are great but on net they have actually done 
quite well. Sentencing commissions have gotten a bad rap be-
cause of the one that I worked for. And I totally get that, because 
that is true and it is important to ask why that sentencing com-
mission was particularly bad and why the others have done bet-
ter. And so, when we are thinking about using sentencing com-
missions or using agencies, it’s important to take the best 
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agencies that we’ve had using criminal justice policies, as op-
posed to looking at the worst and deciding it can’t work at all. 
States with sentencing commissions have slowed the growth in 
corrections spending in their states and have saved money. And 
they have slowed the growth in incarceration. So this is a model 
that can work and we’ve learned some lessons from those com-
missions of how they can be designed. That’s the key. You need 
to design these agencies to reflect the political environment in 
which they work, which means that they really do need to have 
kind of these capacity constraints built into their operation. 
Frankly, they need to look more like other administrative agen-
cies that have to explain why they are doing what they are doing 
to courts, so that it’s not just all politics, so you actually have 
policymaking that’s not arbitrary and capricious.  
I could say lots more about the agency model, but I want to 
be sensitive to the time and get to my third category of things, 
which is I want to bring the courts back into the conversation. 
When we think about what sparks change in American society, 
certainly it could be this movement to elect progressive prosecu-
tors. That’s good, certainly, to the extent that there is a move-
ment for criminal justice reform, I hope it’s used to have some of 
these agencies put in place because I think that’s the kind of long 
term thing we need. But the other thing that can spark change 
is a court decision. When our courts protect constitutional val-
ues, that’s actually critically important. The Supreme Court did 
this. California’s reforms would have never gotten underway at 
all if it weren’t for a Supreme Court decision in Plata that held 
that their prisons were unconstitutionally overcrowded.70  
If we think about the two biggest reasons for incarceration 
drops—the biggest incarceration drops—one was the U.S. sen-
tencing commission. Thirty thousand people being let out of fed-
eral prison early is a big one.71 The other is the enormous drop 
in California, and it was sparked by a court decision. So, we see 
both the importance of an agency and we see the importance of 
a court. But Plata, and I cannot emphasize this enough, was an 
outlier Supreme Court decision. By and large, the Supreme 
Court has done nothing to check mass incarceration, and in fact 
it has done nothing even though there are doctrinal areas where 
it should be doing more.  
 
 70. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2010).  
 71. See Justin Worland, What Happened When California Released 30,000 
Prisoners, TIME (Oct. 7, 2015), https://time.com/4065359/california-prison 
-release-department-of-justice/ [https://perma.cc/XVU7-F5SS]. 
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We do, in fact, have an Eighth Amendment that bans cruel 
and unusual punishments, but the Supreme Court has done very 
little outside the death penalty to police it. It has created im-
munity doctrines for police and prosecutors out of whole cloth 
that are not to be found in the text of anything. It has failed to 
enforce the fact that you should not be imprisoned in America 
because you are too poor to pay. And federal courts around the 
country, unfortunately, are failing to enforce that protection so 
people are being incarcerated because of fines and fees that they 
have not paid.  
When we think about why might that be, why do we have a 
bench that hasn’t done more, I want to emphasize the fact of 
who’s on it: lots of former prosecutors. And this is something I 
didn’t need to limit to the bench by the way—we have former 
prosecutors kind of dominating public life. They run for office, 
they are governors and legislators. But I do want to focus on the 
fact that they are judges in disproportionate amounts. So, if you 
look at the federal bench, it is really an enormous number of peo-
ple on the federal bench who have previously served as prosecu-
tors. And, as compared to people who did public defense work, 
it’s a four-to-one ratio.72  
And this imbalance persisted even under President Obama 
who claimed to be very interested in criminal justice reform. Be-
fore he took office, forty-three percent of the judges were prose-
cutors and ten percent had public defense experience.73 After his 
eight years, forty-one percent had prosecution experience and 
fourteen percent had public defense experience.74 So, the needle 
was moved only slightly. I was recently at an event at NYU that 
Judge Restrepo of the Third Circuit was at on this topic, and he 
did some of his own counting. He found that we have had nine-
teen Supreme Court justices with prosecution experience and 
zero with public defense. Of the 163 active circuit judges in the 
United States (these are appellate), fifty-seven were former pros-
ecutors, five were public defenders. If you look at state courts, 
it’s similar. States with elected Supreme Court justices, thirty-
nine percent were former prosecutors, eight percent former de-
fenders.75 You might think it’s better in states that appoint their 
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justices. In appointed jurisdictions, fifty-three percent were for-
mer prosecutors, and three percent were former defenders. In 
addition, CATO did a study of judges on the federal bench and 
asked what the numbers looked like if you didn’t even limit your-
self just to criminal prosecution on the government side—so in-
cluding government-side civil enforcers. And when you do that, 
it’s a seven-to-one ratio in favor of people who worked for the 
government.  
I think that’s really important. I think it’s really important 
to ask if it’s healthy to have a bench that’s this imbalanced when 
their role is to check the government, their role is to help check 
the government against individual abuse. I think it’s really im-
portant to have more people on the bench who have spent careers 
representing individuals against the government and protecting 
individual liberties. I think it should be a critical path for reform, 
that we think about this imbalance on both the federal and the 
state bench. I think it’s part of Frank’s point about actors with 
discretion, and I think courts are a big part of that. These folks 
have a lot of discretion, and I think people who are interested in 
criminal justice reform who are focused on prosecutors should in 
addition really think about judges as well. And so those are my 
big three institutional pillars. I will stop there, and I think there 
is time for questions. 
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